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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

7 January 1949

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NO. 115

SUBJECT: CIA Comments on

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1. CIA believes that on 27 November 1948, when subject report was published, there was a serious possibility that open warfare might develop between India and Pakistan in view of the situation then prevailing in Kashmir. Subsequently, however, the situation has materially changed; the Governments of both Pakistan and India have accepted the 11 December proposals of the UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) and as a result a cease-fire has been established in Kashmir preliminary to attempts to hold a plebiscite. At present all fighting has ceased, both sides have reportedly welcomed the end of hostilities, and, except in the unlikely event that fighting is renewed because of irresponsible action by unit commanders in the field no immediate danger of open war appears to exist. Should it subsequently become apparent that conditions permitting a free and impartial plebiscite as contemplated by UNCIP cannot be established in Kashmir and should either side accuse the other of non-cooperation and bad faith, the situation would of course once again become grave. The situation should remain static and non-critical, however, for a period of at least six months.

2. CIA does not concur with the opinion expressed in subject report that the present Government of Pakistan, greatly influenced as it is by such men as Sir Francis Mudie, Sir Ambrose Dundas, and General Sir Douglas Gracey, would turn to the USSR for assistance in the event of open war with India. Even if a decision to seek Soviet aid were made, it would probably be delayed too long to prevent collapse of the government's authority as a result of defeats in the field. CIA agrees that the USSR, seeking to prolong the strife, would attempt to help the Moslem forces as the weaker party. It is believed, however, that the USSR would be careful not to risk losing the great potential value of India's friendship and would therefore aid the Moslems openly only if pro-Soviet groups first became dominant in the Dominion of India.

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